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Resolving Technological Controversies
in Regulatory Agencies
Sidney A. Shapiro*
Introduction
In May 1994, a U.S. District Court in Wisconsin upheld the "Land
and Resources Management Plan (Plan)" adopted by the U.S. Forest
Service for the Chequamegon National Forest. 1 The judge rejected a
claim by several environmental groups that the Forest Service had
improperly rejected important scientific evidence concerning an agency
2
obligation to protect biological diversity.
This paper uses that dispute to explain and analyze how
administrative agencies resolve scientific and technological
controversies. First, it summarizes the nature of the dispute concerning
the Plan. Then, it analyzes procedures the Forest Service and other
agencies use to resolve scientific and technical disputes. Finally, it
considers the role of judicial review in resolving such disputes.
The paper concludes, first, that use of additional procedures, e.g.,
meetings with interested persons or advisory committees, might
increase rule making accuracy, but such procedures will also delay an
already slow process and should be left to the discretion of individual
agencies. It also concludes that judicial review for "adequate reasons"
can help ensure that agency actions are rational, but such review also
invites judges to second-guess regulatory choices. Judges can avoid this
tendency by using a "pass-fail" test to determine whether an agency has
a satisfactory explanation for its actions.
The Dispute
The National Forest Management Act requires the Forest Service to
develop specific objectives for recreational and commercial use of each
* Professor Shapiro, a graduate of the Wharton School of Business and the University of Pennsylvania School of Law, is Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas.
1
2

Sierra Club v. Marita, 845 F.Supp. 1317 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
1Id. at 1319.
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national forest and to proscribe a management plan to achieve those
objectives. 3 These plans must protect biological diversity 4 and be
based on an integrated understanding of the major natural and social
sciences. 5 The Forest Service and the environmentalists had different
conceptions of how to best protect the biodiversity in the
Chequamegon forest. The environmentalists sought to protect large
sections of undeveloped land, but the Service declined to take this
approach.
Two Approaches To Biodiversity

The Plan was based on the scientific premise that biodiversity is best
protected by diversifying local habitats. 6 In a forest, this premise
requires two actions. First, the Forest Service must maintain different
species of trees found in the forest. Second, it must ensure that trees of
different ages are maintained. In the Chequamegon forest, the Service
identified three tree species and said it would maintain small, medium
7
and large trees of each species.
The environmentalist adopted a different scientific premise. They
maintained that the larger a habitat, the more likely it is that a species
will survive a catastrophic disturbance. 8 On this and similar
grounds, 9 they contended that the Forest Service should establish
two "Diversity Maintenance Areas (Dams)" each consisting of at least
50,000 acres that would not be developed. 10
3 National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1600.
4 Id. § 160 4 (g)(3); see 36 C.F.R § 219.3, 219.26, 219. 2 7(g). The Service is also
obligated by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to evaluate the
environmental impact of how federal lands are used which includes the impact on
biological diversity. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
5 36 C.F.tL § 219.5(a).
6 Sierra Club, 845 F. Supp. at 1322.

7

Id.

8 Id. at 1324.
9 The environmentalists offered two additional reasons to support their request to
set aside undeveloped land to protect biodiversity. They argued that biological
diversity declines as habitats are isolated because organisms can not survive
disturbances in one habitat by migrating to another. This understanding is based on
the study of biodiversity on oceanic islands and is known as "island biogeography."
Id. They also argued that biodiversity is related to the extent to which a habitat is
penetrated by adverse external forces, or "edge effects," from adjacent habitats. Id.
10 Id.
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Science andPolicy
Like many regulatory controversies, the disagreement between the
Service and the environmentalists was not solely a scientific dispute.
The issue was the extent to which the ecology literature compelled the
conclusion that Dams were the best way to protect biodiversity. To
decide, the Forest Service had to resolve three issues. The last involved a
policy choice rather than a scientific question.
First, the Service had to decide whether studies cited by
environmentalists were valid, a "scientific" issue requiring the
application of scientific training and experience.1 1 It conceded that the
12
plaintiffs' position rested on "sound ecological theory."
Second, it had to decide whether it should infer from the studies
that protection of biodiversity in the Chequamegon forest required the
use of Dams. This issue is also "scientific." Laypersons can evaluate such
inferences only to the extent that they are competent to evaluate the
validity of the scientific assumptions that undergird them. 13 The
Forest Service discounted research cited by the environmentalists
because it was conducted in ecosystems substantially different than the
Chequamegon forest. 14 The environmentalists, however, had offered
substantial expert opinion evidence that these studies did support the
16
need for Dams. 1 5 As one expert explained,

Supporting large reserves these days is like supporting
motherhood. The overwhelming consensus among
ecologists and biogeographers is "the larger the better."
The Service's response to this expert evidence was rather
17
remarkable. The Chief Forester explained,
11 Sidney Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures:
Evaluating the FDAs Public Boardof Inquiry, 1986 Duke LJ. 288, 292.
12 The Court found that environmentalists had presented the Forest Service with "a
wealth of authority" to back up their position and that the Service offered "nothing
that directly contradicts the plaintiffs' scientific analysis." 845 F. Supp. at 1329.

13 Thomas McGarity, Substantive & Procedural Discretion in Administrative
Resolution of Science Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA & OSHA, 67 Geo.
L.J 729,746 (1979).
14 Sierra Club, 845 F. Supp. at 1329.
15 Thirteen experts on biodiversity, however, had unanimously agreed that
biodiversity
16 Id.

could not be maintained without establishing Dams. Id. at 1317.

[U]ntil there is conclusive, empirical evidence that the
conclusions, hypothesis, or predictive capabilities for
terrestrial ecosystems are valid, it is proper to acknowledge
[such inferences] as untested theory.
This is also true for the agency's own scientific premise. It also lacked
conclusive proof that the best way to protect biodiversity was by
maintaining habitat diversity. Indeed, no agency has the luxury of
waiting for conclusive scientific proof before acting.
As thd final issue, the Forest Service was presented with a policy
question. It acted on one scientific premise; the environmentalists on
another. Apparently, some evidence supported both. When there is a
expert scientific disagreement, a regulatory agency must decide what is
appropriate under its statutory mandate. This issue is not a scientific
question because scientific training is unhelpful in its resolution. Legal
18
and policymaking expertise comes into play at this point.
The Forest Service's policy preference for its own approach to
protecting biodiversity may have represented its judgment that this
approach best served its statutory mandate. But there is another possible
explanation. The sale of government timber is worth million of dollars
which is shared between the federal and state governments.1 9 Thus,
the agency's rejection of Dams may also reflect political pressure, to
maximize logging operations in the national forests.
The Hearing Process
The dispute between the Forest Service and the environmentalists
arose in the rulemaking process used by the agency to adopt the
Plan. 20 The APA does not requires notice and comment procedures
for the adoption of rules concerning public property, 2 1 but the Forest
17 Id.

18 Sidney Shapiro, supra note 11, at 292, 294.
19 16 U.S.C. §§ 499-500; see Michael E. Shapiro, Sagebrush and Seaweed
Robbery: State Revenue Losses From Onshore and Offshore Federal Lands, 12
Ecology L.Q. 481, 481 n.3 (1985) (Receipts from the sale and use of federal timber
totaled $900 in fiscal year 1984).
20 According to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the plan for the
Chequamegon forest was a "rule" because it regulated the agency's future conduct
concerning the forest. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
21 Id. § 553. An agency, however, must use formal rulemaking if its statutory
mandate requires it to promulgate a rule "on the record after an opportunity for a
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Service voluntarily used them. 2 2 Beyond these procedures, local
23
officials also held meetings with interested persons.
Notice and Comment Rule making
Congress normally requires notice and comment rule making for
the resolution of technological and scientific controversies. Moreover,
the Supreme Court has ruled that the federal courts -may not require
more.
Under the APA, an agency must allow interested parties to file
written comments, but there is no requirement that it hold some type
of hearing.24 The notice and comment rulemaking process is known as
'informal" rule making, while rule making that includes additional
procedures is described as "hybrid" rule making. The courts have not
25
had authority to require hybrid rule making since Vermont Yankee.
There, the Supreme Court reversed a ruling by the D.C. Circuit that
cross-examination of expert witnesses might be necessary for the
resolution of scientific disputes. The Court held that the courts could
not impose on agencies greater procedural requirements than those
26
required by the APA or another applicable statute.
Congress, however, sometimes requires hybrid rule making. The
1977 Clean Air Act amendments, for example, require EPA to provide
27
an opportunity for oral presentation of data, views or arguments.
The 1974 amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act require
28
rulemaking hearings to include cross-examination of some witnesses.
hearing." Id, § 553(c).
The rulemaking procedures of the APA do not apply to matters relating to public
property, id § 553(a)(2), but Forest Service regulations required the use 6f such
procedures. 36 C.F.R. § 219.6. The Forest Service must give notice of its intention to
adopt a plan and invite written public comments. 36 C.F.R. at § 219.6(b)-(d).
22

23

See id§ 219.6(d).

24 See supra note 21 & accompanying text. The Service, however, is required to
hold such meetings in certain circumstances by its procedural regulations. 36 C.F.R. §
219.6(d).
25 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
26 The Court has also reduced the number of agencies required to use formal
rulemaking, U.S. v. Florida East Coast, 410 U.S. 224 (1973), or hybrid rulemaking,

U.S. v. Allegahny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
27 42 U.S.C. § 7607.
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The Adequacy ofRulemaking Procedures
Such developments raise the issue of whether informal rule making
is adequate to resolve technical disputes. For example, under what
circumstances, if any, should agencies use meetings as the Forest Service
did? As Professor Crampton pointed out long ago, the answer "must
rest on a judgment that balances the advantages and disadvantages of
30
each proposal." 2 9 He recommended that the analyst consider:
(1) the extent to which the procedure furthers the accurate
selection and determination of the relevant facts and issues;
(2) the extent to which it furthers the disposition of
business; and (3) the extent to which the procedure, when
viewed in the light of statutory objectives, is acceptable to
the agency, the participants, and the general public.
When so judged, informal rule making is normally appropriate for
scientific and technical disputes, but additional procedures may be
useful. Whether to use them, however, should be left to agencies.
In Vermont Yankee, the Court observed that hybrid rule making is
unnecessary for the accurate resolution of scientific and technological
disputes. 3 1 This reflects Professor Davis' famous insight that trial-type
hearings are necessary only for accurate resolution of "adjudicative
facts" or ones uniquely within the possession of individuals. Davis
argued that informal rule making is adequate to find what he called
"legislative" or "policy facts." Hybrid rule making is unnecessary
because legislative facts are widely available in the scientific and
technical literature. 32 Professor Boyer's study of hybrid rule making at
the FTC supports this conclusion. He found it to be expensive and
33
burdensome, with no detectable increases in fairness or accuracy.
28 15 U.S.C. § 557a.
29 Roger Crampton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The Effects of S. 1663 On
the Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 Admin. L.Rev. 108, 111-12 (1964).

30 Id.
31 435 U.S. at 524 .
32 See Kenneth C. Davis & Richard Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, § 9.2,
at 7 (1994) (The "most useful sources of data for resolution of disputes concerning
legislative facts often are contained in the published literature of the social or natural
science disciplines relevant to the legislative fact at issue.")
33 Barry Boyer, Report on the Trade Regulation Rulemaking Procedures of the
Federal Trade Commission (Phase III), 1979 ACUS Ann. Rep. 41; 1980 ACUS Ann.
Rep. 33.
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While generally valid, Professor Davis' distinction does not always
hold up for scientific and technical disputes. Hearing procedures, for
example, may be useful to examine assumptions from which experts
draw interpretation of scientific evidence. 34 Although such inferences
may be "result-oriented and highly policy-dominated," notice and
comment rule making may not reveal this bias. 3 5 This problem can be
addressed by cross-examination of expert witnesses, 3 6 but more
informal methods can also be used, such as advisory committees or
37
meetings between agency and nongovernmental scientists.
Another defect of notice and comment rule making is that it does
not allow the agency to probe the magnitude of policy disagreements
among interested persons. As explained earlier, an agency must make a
policy choice when experts disagree concerning inferences to be drawn
from scientific and technical information. 3 8 In such circumstances,
negotiation may produce an agreement between organized interests and
39
the agency concerning appropriate policy.
Although hybrid rule making may be useful, it can also impose
greater burdens than benefits. Since agencies are in the best position to
make cost-benefit process decisions, Congress and the courts should let
them decide when to use additional procedures. Congress, however,
should require agencies to share information concerning their
experiences. This would create a data bank that agencies could consult
when the issue of additional procedures comes up.
HybridProcedures

Agencies that want to use hybrid rule making have two options.
One is to hold some type of hearing. 4 0 The other is to involve
scientists in decision making. As noted, agencies can appoint scientific
or technical advisory committee. 4 1 They can also convene hearings
34 Sidney Shapiro, supra note 11, at 298.
35 Thomas McGarity, supra note 13, at 777-78.
36 Id. at 778.
37 Sidney Shapiro, supra note 11, at 299-304.
38 See supra note 18 & accompanying text.
39 See Regulatory Negotiation Act, 5 U.S.C. §5 561-570.
40 The Service met with interested parties. An agency can also invite interested
persons to make short presentations in a legislative type hearing. More elaborate
hearings would involve the examination, and even cross-examination, of witnesses.
_________6
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presided over by panels of scientists4 2 along the lines of the long43
proposed "Science Court."
In these roles, scientists can explain complex technical issues,
provide peer review for agency decisions, and identify areas of
consensus among scientists. 4 4 When they function in this fashion,
scientists can improve the accuracy of agency decision making. The
usefulness of such input, however, is limited to scientific questions. As
discussed earlier, technical expertise has no particular virtue concerning
45
the resolution of policy issues.
Most administrators understand that policy questions should not be
referred to scientists. Nevertheless, there are two potential problems
with advisory committees and scientific panels. First, it is often difficult
to separate questions of pure science from their policy components.
Second, it may be politically beneficial for an administrator to ignore
the science/,policy distinction. As long as the policy aspect of a
science/policy question is not immediately apparent to the public, the
decision maker can use a scientific advisory committee or panel as a
shield from criticism for policy choices by maintaining that the decision
was made in accordance with the neutral advice of independent
scientists. 46 These problems do not require that agencies forgo the use
of scientific advice in the rulemaking process, but only that proper
47
precautions be taken to mitigate this danger.

41 See Sidney Shapiro, supra note 11, at 302-303 (describes advisory committees).
42 See id at 303-04 (description of scientific hearing panels).
43 E.g., Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposalfor an Institution for Scientific Judgment,
156 Science 763 (1967); see generally, Twenty-five Year Retrospective On The
Science Court: A Symposium, 4 Risk 95 (1993).
44 Sidney Shapiro & Thomas McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory
Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YaleJ. on Reg. 1, 35 (1989).
45 See supra note 18 & accompanying text.
46 Thomas McGarity & Sidney Shapiro, Workers at Risk- The Failed Promise of
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 196 (1993). For this strategy to
work, an administrator will have to select scientists with the same policy preferences.
This can be relatively easily done by choosing scientists whose past actions of scientists
indicate how they will resolve science/policy questions. Id.
47 See Sidney Shapiro, Public Accountability of Advisory Committees, 1 Risk 189
(1990) (discussing procedures to increase the accountability of advisory committees).
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Judicial Review
The environmentalists sought judicial review after the Forest Service
declined to adopt their position. Whether courts can play a useful role
in resolving scientific and technological disputes has been a subject of
considerable debate in administrative law. The following describes the
scope of judicial review, the debate concerning such review and how
that debate relates to the district court opinion. This section concludes
that courts have an important, but limited, role to play concerning the
appropriate resolution of science and technology disputes.

RationalConnection

48
In State Farm, the Supreme Court required agencies to:
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for [an] action including a "rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made."
If an agency fails to establish the necessary rational connection, its
action is "arbitrary and capricious." 4 9 Nevertheless, a court will
normally remand a rule to an agency rather than declaring the rule to
be invalid. The remand recognizes that an agency might offer adequate
reasons if given another opportunity

The Controversy
State Farm appears to endorse "hard look" review. 5 0 Judge
Leventhal coined the term for an agency's obligation to take a "hard
look" at the evidence and available policy options. 5 1 Such review has
52
been identified as a principal cause of the slowdown of rule making.
48 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
49 State Farm indicated an agency would fail to offer an adequate justification in the
following circumstances: "Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." Id.
50 Cass Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Review Doctrine, 1983 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 177, 210.
51 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
52 Thomas McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifjing" the Rulemaking Process,
41 Duke L.J. 1385 (1992).
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The problem is that this form of review invites courts to remand
whenever there is "some" discrepancy between the agency's conclusion
and its evidence, even if the discrepancy is not significant. 53 Most
agencies have been the subject of this type of judicial behavior, but its
extent is uncertain. 5 4 Nevertheless, agency lawyers must take into
account the possibility of stringent judicial review. They will therefore
seek to minimize the chance that a court will remand a rule because the
agency failed to respond to a comment, ignored a regulatory
alternative, or made some other error. Not surprising, such flyspecking
55
substantially slows rule making.
Hard look review can help ensure that agency decisions meet a
minimal level of rationality, but such review also invites courts to
second-guess agency decision making. For this reason, courts should
use something like a "pass-fail" test. According to this metaphor, the
judge's disagreement with the agency's conclusion is not a reason for a
failing grade. Only where there is an inexcusable gap in the analysis,
obvious misquote, or evidence of intellectual dishonesty should the
56
judge send back the agency's action.

53 See Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of Law & Policy, 38 Admin.
L.Rev. 363, 388 (1986) (questioning the capacity of judges to supervise the substance
of agency policymaking).
54 Patricia M. Wald, Regulation At Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most
of the Problem? 67 S.Cal. L.Rev. 621 (1994). For example, Professor Melnick has
found that aggressive review substantially interfered with EPA's implementation of
the CAA, R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act
(1983), but a later study by Rosemary O'Leary concluded that judges have actively
and aggressively intervened only "in the smallest minority of cases." Rosemary
O'Leary, Environmental Change: Federal Courts and the EPA 169 (1993).
55 See Richard J. Pierce, Two Problems in Administrative Law: PoliticalPolarity
on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Rulemaking, 1988
Duke L.J. 300, 310 ("to survive judicial review, an agency's 'concise general' statement
of basis and purpose must deal comprehensively and in detail with each issue raised in
the comments, no matter how trivial that issue appears to the agency."); Jerry Mashaw
& David Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4
Yale J. on Reg. 257, 282 (describing how agencies adopt a "full court press" in light of
judicial requirements that the agency respond to every serious comment).
56 McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 46, at 260.
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The Application
In the Chequamegon forest case, the district court concluded that
7
the: 5
Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, etc. in failing
to base its diversity analysis on principles of conservation
biology set forth by plaintiffs.
The court's review illustrates both the upside and downside potential of
hard look review. As you may recall, the agency defended its plan on
the ground that the scientific evidence of the environmentalists was not
conclusive. In particular, the agency discounted research because it took
place in ecosystems that were different from the Chequamegon
forest. 58 The environmentalists, however, had submitted substantial
expert opinion evidence that these studies did suggest that protection
of biodiversity in the Chequamegon forest 'required Dams. 5 9 The
district court's opinion is unclear concerning on what grounds the
Forest Service disregarded this opinion evidence.
If the agency had offered no explanation why it discounted this
evidence, the district court should have remanded the plan back to the
agency. An agency's failure to offer any explanation why it rejected
legitimate expert opinion evidence is a ground for a remand. 60 As
discussed earlier, however, the Chief Forester said that until the
environmentalists had conclusive proof for their position, it was only a
"theory." 6 1 This explanation is also inadequate. The Forest Service also
lacked conclusive proof for its approach. The agency has an obligation
to explain why it picked one theory over the other. If the agency
offered such 'an explanation, however, the court should apply a "passfail" test. When an agency is making "predictions, within its area of
special expertise, at the frontiers of science," the Supreme Court
requires review to be at its "most deferential." 62
57 Sierra Club, 845 F. Supp. at 1330.

58 See supra notes 14 & accompanying text.
59 See supra notes 15 & accompanying text.

60 See supra note 49.
61 Supra note 17 & accompanying text.
62 Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
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Conclusion
The administrative law system uses a minimal adversarial process to
resolve scientific and technological disputes. Most agencies adopt new
regulatory policies by notice and comment rule making that is subject
to judicial review under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review. To meet this scope of review, an agency must furnish an
adequate explanation or justification for its actions.
The adequacy of this system concerning this resolution of scientific
and technical disputes has long been the subject of a two-part discussion
in administrative law. One issue is whether notice and comment rule
making is sufficient to ensure the accuracy of agency decisions. The
second issue is whether review for adequate reasons is in part responsible
for slow process of rule making.
Additional procedures, such as meetings and advisory committees,
might increase process accuracy, but they will also delay already slow
rule making. Agencies are in the best position to judge whether the
benefits of additional procedure outweigh such delay. Congress and the
courts should therefore delegate to agencies the decision whether to use
additional procedures. Congress, however, should require agencies to
share information concerning the efficacy of such procedures. Agencies
could turn to this data bank when they consider whether to .do more
than notice and comment rule making.
Judicial review for adequate reasons helps to ensure that agencies
have rational reasons for their actions. This type of review, however, also
invites judges to second-guess agencies concerning their policy choices.
Judges can avoid this tendency if they use a "pass-fail" test to decide
whether an agency has offered a satisfactory explanation for its actions.

